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BRIEF OF RESPO:lDENT 
STAT81E"IT OF CASE 
The appellant, Craig Rees, has appealed fran the decision 
of the Honorable Venoy Christopherson, Judge, First Judicial District 
Court, granting a surrmary judgment in favor of the respondent, 
Albertson' s Inc. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
It is from the sumnary judgment granted the respondent and 
the order of the court denying appellant's notion for review that 
this appeal is made. 
STATE11ENI' OF FACTS 
On or about the rrorning of Septanber 3, 1974, appellant P.ees 
and McGehee purchased some beer; the appellant does not remember where. 
Later that rrorning, the two mentioned above, picked up Harris and 
Andrews. The four then bot1g .. ht rrore beer, allegedly from respondent 
Albertson's Inc., and a fifth of 100 proof liquor fran the State Liquor 
Store. The four then drove to Bear Lake and on the way, appellant and 
McGehee were mixing the liquor wi.t..h their beer. (Langford Dep. 15 : 9-19; 
20:2-4). They drove into Idaho where additional beer was purchased. 
While returning to Logan, they experienced a seriot!s auto!IDbile accident 
wherein Andrews and McGehee were killed and Harris injured. (R22) 
As a result of the deaths and injury appellant Rees made payment 
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in satisfaction thereof in total settlement of $54,742.50. Appellant 
Rees then brought suit against respondent Albertson's Inc. for contri-
bution pursuant to the Comparative Negligence Act of Utah, Utah Code 
Annotated 78-27-39 (1953, as amended). 
On or about April 22, 1977, respondent filed a motion for 
sumiary judgment, (R35), which was supported by a merrorandum, (R36). 
On or about May 5, 1977, appellant filed a mem:rrandum in opposition to 
respondent's m:>tion for surrmary judgment, (R44). Thereafter, respondent's 
counsel, Stephen G. furgan, and appellant's counsel, John M. Chipm3I1, 
stipulated that the clerk of the court would not be advised that the 1111t-
ter was ready for decision (pursuant to Rule 2. 8 of the Rules of Practice 
for the District Courts of the State of Utah) until respondent had an opJXll 
ttmity to file an Affidavit of Newell G. Knight, (R48). On or about May 
27, 1977, the court, being unaware of said stipulation, filed its rnaror-
andum decision denying respondent's motion for sumnary judgment, (RSS). 
Thereafter, on June 17, 1977, Mr. furgan received and filed the Affidavit 
of Newell G. Knight (R49, 51). On July 5, 1977, the court wrote a letter 
to Stephen G. furgan with a copy to John M. Chipman, which stated as follm. 
"In view of the affidavit of Mr. Newell G. Knight, 
the court feels it is in order to review its decision 
and i;.rntld suggest a motion to review or set aside the 
decision in order that counsel for the plaintiff would 
have time for an appropriate response to said motion." 
(See Exhibit A attached) (R54) 
Thereafter, on or about July 8, 1977, respondent filed a motion to review 
and set aside the order denying respondent's m:>tion for su:rmrry jud~t 
which was supported by the Affidavit of Newell G. Knight, (RSS, RS8) · 
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Thereafter, on or about August 3, 1977, appellant filed a cotmter-affidavit 
of Stewart C. Harvey, (R63). On or about August 9, 1977, respondent filed 
a memorandum in reply to the affidavit of Stewart C. Harvey, (R66). On 
or about August 17, 1977, appellant filed by mail a request for oral argu-
ment on respondent's notion to review, (R70) . 
On or about August 23, 1977, the court filed its IllfflOranch.m deci-
sion granting respondent' s rrotion to review and set aside the order denying 
respondent's notion for suarnary judgment and granting suarnary judgment in 
favor of respondent, (R71). On or about August 30, 1977, appellant filed a 
rotion to review and set aside the order granting respondent's rrotion for 
sumary judgment, (R76). On or about October 26, 1977, the court filed its 
mem:>randum decision denying appellant's notion to review, (R79; see also App. 
Brief p. 5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINI' I 
1HE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ER..ll IN GRANI'm'.; RESPONDENT'S 
MOITON TO REVIE.W AND SET ASIDE AN ORDER DENTIN; RE-
SPONDEITT Is MOITON FOR SUM1ARY .JUIG1ENI' 
The court granted respondent's notion to review the court's denial 
of its rrotion to suarnary judgment in accordance with Rule 60 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) (1) provides: 
Ch notion and upon such tenns as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
In this case the mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable ne-
glect occurred when the respondent filed its IIDtion for sumiary judgment with 
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its supporting merrorandum and appellant filed its merrorandum in oppositic· 
to the rrotion for surrmary judgment and both entered into a stipulation t~ 
neither would notify the clerk of the court to submit the matter for deci-
sion until respondent had had an opportunity to file an affidavit of Nei·:e' 
G. Knight. The court being unaware of the stipulation, elected to decide 
respondent's rrotion before either appellant or respondent had contacted ti.-
clerk of the court to notify him that the matter was ready for decision in 
accordance with Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in District Court of the 
State of Utah. 
Pursuant to Rule 60 U. R. C. P. respondent made its rrotion to revie. 
After considering the motion to review and the accompanying affidavit file: 
by respondent and appellant's counter-affidavit, the court granted responik1 
motion to review and granted surrmary judg;:nent in favor of the respondent. 
In Meagher v. F.quity Oil Co. , 5 Utah 2d 196, 299 P. 2d 827 (1956) , 
the court held that: 
It is well established that the court may vacate, set 
aside or modify its orders or judgments entered by mistake 
or inadvertance which do not accurately reflect the results 
of its judgfllf!Il::s. 
In the present case, the trial court ruled on the m::ition for sunmary judg· 
ment prior to having considered the respondent's affidavit or appellant's 
counter-affidavit. After the trial court became aware of this additional 
information, the court felt that "it is in order to review its deci-
sions and suggested that counsel file a notion to review or set aside the 
decision in order that counsel for the plaintiff have time for an approprL~ 
response to said motion." (See Exhibit "A" attached) . Thereafter, the 
court waited for both sides to file all the rrotions and rnerrorandums they IE-
I 
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sired and after reviewinz the same, the court then co=ectly granted re-
spondent' s TIDtion to review and surrrrary judgnent. 
In 60 C.J.S. 94 (Motions and Orders §62(1), it provides that: 
A court, while retaining jurisdiction over the cause 
in the progress of which it made an order, may, for suffi-
cient cause shown, amend, resettle, nodify, or vacate the 
order. 
This appears to be the general rule in nost jurisdictions, including Utah. 
In Re Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (1975), involved a lower 
court that had granted a notion to strike objections to an accounting 
of an estate. The notion to vacate that order was held to be the effec-
tive order in the case. 
Through dicta, the court in Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 
P. 1023 (1911), said: 
According to some of these decisions (speaking of 
decisions in other jurisdictions cited earlier in the 
case), a second application for a new trial may be made 
within the term in which the judgment was rendered, when 
it is based on grounds not included in the first appli-
cation, and satisfactory reasons given for the anission. 
(The procedural rules involved in Luke are materially the same as the 
current rules.) These exanples vxruld clearly indicate that there exists 
a nDtion to review a prior order, both in case law and in the statutes. 
Drury v. ll.m.ceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, (1966), and 
!Jtah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 211, 469 P.2d 1 
(1970), the~ cases used by the appellant in its brief in support of 
its position are distinguishable from the present case. In the ~ 
v. Lunceford, case supra, from which the appellant quotes dicta, the 
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court speaks of a rrotion to review a gr3Iltin.". or denyinp; of a motion 
for new trial not being in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is 
significant to note that later in that case the court says that: 
It should be observed that what we have said herein 
is intended to apply to the fact situation shown in the 
instant case wnere, pursuant to regular procedure, the 
court has acted deliberately and advisedly in granting 
the new trial. However, we also recognize that there may 
be situations where an order denying or granting a new 
trial may have been made by inadvertence or mistake, 
or where there was some irregularity in connection with 
the obtaining or the granting of the order, in which 
instance the court could of course act to correct any 
such mistake or irregularity. 
In the present case the court did not have access to the affidavits and 
thus did not act advisedly in denying respondent's rrotion for s=.ary 
jud~ent. This inadvertence or mistake justified the trial court in 
reviewing the denial of respondent's rrotion for surrmary judgi:nent and, 
in fact, the court suggested that a motion to review or set aside "-Uuld 
be appropriate under the circumstances. (See exhibit A attached) 
In Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, supra, while 
doubting that a rrotion to reconsider a jud~ent denying a rrotion to 
vacate judgpient is authorized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the court looked at the merits of the rrotion. After finding no merit 
in the notion and that the opposing party had not received notice of 
the notion, the court ruled that the trial courts acting on and hearing 
the motion was error. In the present case the appellant had notice of 
the motion to review and the accompanying affidavit, and pursuant to 
such, appellant filed a counter-affidavit. The mistake and inadvertence 
I 
...... 
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involved in not providing the trial court with all of the information 
prior to its denial of the rrotion for sumnary judgment and the sub-
sequently provided infonnation to the trial court with the rrotion to 
review, show good merits upon which the court could base both hearing 
and acting on the notion to review. In addition, the court suggested 
that a rrotion for review or set aside would be appropriate under the 
circumstances. (See Exhibit A attached). 
Thus the trial court did not err in granting respondent's 
rrotion to review and set aside an order denying respondent's l!Otion 
for sumnary judgment. 
POINr II 
1HE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANrING RESPONDENT'S 
MJI'ION FOR SUMr1"..ARY JUDGMENT 
There is no conflict between the opinions of respondent's 
expert and those of appellant's expert. Therefore, there is no dis-
pute of fact and the trial court's granting of respondent's nntion for 
smmary judgment was correct. 
Appellant's expert, Stewart C. Harvey, states that in his 
opinion, "it is possible to detennine that the alcohol from the beer 
purcbased from Albertson's (respondent) and consuned by Plaintiff Rees 
(appellant) was still in Mr. Rees' (appellant's) system at the tilre 
of the accident in question and therefore \.X:luld contribute to Plaintiff's 
(appellant's) intoxication at the time of the accident in question." 
Respondent's expert, Newell G. Knight, states that in his 
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opinion, "there is no way in which it is possible to calculate the 
arrDlmt of intoxication, if any, that could have resulted from the beer 
purchased from Albertson's Inc. (respondent) . In other words, in my 
opinion, it ~uld be irrpossible to detennine whether or not the beer 
purchased from Albertson's (respondent) was a proxinate cause of Plain-
tiff's (appellant's) intoxication at the time of the accident in ques-
tion." 
Appellant argues that these h-D opinions are in conflict and 
that the granting of sumnary judg;:nent was error by the trial court be-
cause there is a dispute of facts. In reality the h-D opinions are not 
in conflict and therefore, there is no dispute of fact. 
Assuming that appellant's expert is correct that some of the 
beer purchased frc:rn respondent was still in appellant' s system at the tin 
of the accident, that does not mean, ipso facto, that whatever anDunt 
that was left in appellant's system was a proximate cause of appellant's 
intoxication at the time of the accident. Section 41-6-44(b)(l), Utah 
Code Armotated 1953, was amended, provides that if there was at that tirr 
0.05 percent or less by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, it shal. 
be presumed that the person was not tmder the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. 
Therefore, in the present case, if the arrotmt of respondent's 
beer left in appellant's system at the time of the accident was 0.05 
percent or less by weight of alcohol , then respondent' s beer left in 
appellant's systan was not a proximate cause of appellant 's intoxicaticm 
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The n-xi experts do not contradict each other, the only difference 
between the two is that respondent's expert goes one step further in 
the analysis than appellant's expert. Appellant's expert says that since 
some of the respondent's beer remained in the appellant's system at the 
time of the accident it contributed to his intoxication. Respondent's 
expert says that even if this is true "it is impossible to calculate the 
anmmt of intoxication, if any, that could have resulted from the beer 
purchased at Albertson's (respondent's)". Appellant's expert does not 
purport: to suggest what the aroount of intoxication, if any, the respon-
dent's beer caused, since as respondent's expert stated that would be 
impossible to determine. There are no issues of fact to render a surrmary 
judgment :inproper. 
Rule 2. 8 of the Rules of Practice in District Court of the State 
of Utah, (e) provides that a "party resisting the rootion may request 
oral argument and such request shall be granted i.mless the UDtion is 
denied. If no such request is made, oral argument shall be deaned to 
have been waived." In the present case the appellant filed its counter-
affidavit on or about August 8, 1977, yet did not make a request for 
oral argument until on or about August 17, 1977. That delay and the 
fact that the merrorandum decision granting the UDtion was issued on 
August 23, 1977, i:.uuld indicate that the trial court i:.uuld be justified 
in deaning the request for oral argument was waived by the appellant. 
Even if the court -was not so justified, the facts that appellant now 
believes create an issue of fact were well laid out in the counter-
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affidavit before the trial court \·.nen it ruled on the I".Dtion for sumrar,· 
judgment. Hence, if there was any error, it was only harmless error 
and v;ould not have changed the granting of sunrnary judgrr.ent in favor of 
respondent. 
COt"lClliSim 
Respondent submits to the court that surrrr.ary judgp1ent in favor 
of respondent was warranted and should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFUILY submitted this ~ J. day of March, 1978. 
IDRGAN, SCAUEY, LUNI' & KIMBIE 
~""~~~ Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent to J. Kent Holland, Esquire, Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant, at his office at 702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84101, this .J!!!!la_y of March, 1978. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
EXHI317 "A" 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
CL( <./I( l 0 :>A"• 
L'' Ll r "I• 81"1' G >-< /\"' 
July 5, 1977 VE:-..av c ... q,9yo,-,.i:qsc .... 
0 ST"11CT JUOGE: 
-'J• l l' "" <>A ... 0':1l PH •6::: "'oqr,.. ...,....,, ... 
r'AP•fP <'1[•'0<./Tt:R LUG·~"< L_'.'.,JQ.o, .... UTA"'i ll.&321 
u ... O.., G .......... 5 C"" 
C::Ju<./'" A0'"'•NtSTR4TQq 
7 S Z-3 ::O<l 2 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 200 State Exchange Building 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Craig Rees vs. Albertson's Inc. 
Civil No. 15841 
Dear Mr. Morgan: 
In view of the affidavit of Mr. Newell G. Knight, 
the Court feels it is in order to review its decision 
and would suggest a motion to review or set aside the 
decision in order that counsel for the plaintiff would 
have time for an appropriate response to/said m. otion. 
Sincer0ly, . · J~ 
1·1' I i / , /// 
VC:lgh 
cc: John M. Chipman 
/; / ,1 ,, ;f ,' ' d-!f---;_,-/-' 
veN y 'dhrt~tloff~r~ri 
District/ Judge ./ 7 / 
JUL O G 1977 
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